Five misconceptions about intervention in Syria

By Alex Bryan

Since reports of a chemical weapons attack launched in Syria by the Assad regime began circulating a week or so ago, debate has intensified over how the West should respond to such a barbarous act which typifies the opportunism and disregard for human rights at the heart of the Syrian state. Some have called for restraint; more have called for action in some form or another, be it humanitarian action, targeted missile strikes or more direct methods of intervention. The sheer scale of the global conversation about how to solve the crisis in Syria by its very nature means that facts are distorted, straw men are constructed and taken apart and the very topic of conversation at times becomes lost amidst the clutter. Here then is a handy guide to a few important misconceptions, mistakes or misplaced concerns the commentariat have expressed about the potential options the West has in facing down Assad.

Misconception 1 – The West is not currently intervening in Syria

As we are talking about foreign policy misconceptions, there seem few places more fitting to start than Tony Blair’s piece in the Times yesterday. Blair notes that other powers are intervening right now, and that they are not terrified by the prospect of intervention. Blair is right; Iran, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and others are intervening in the conflict as we speak. However, he is wrong to imply that the West is not. Intervention, as Blair knows, is a broad term which can cover a whole host of options, military or non-military. It is clear that the UK is engaging with the conflict, as is the U.S.; the fact we have not bombed Syria does not mean we are ‘wringing our hands’ on the sidelines.

Misconception 2 – That the West is chiefly concerned with morals in Syria

Commentators have tended to be fundamentally divided on how they suggest we view Syria. Some, such as Blair, view the need for intervention as one which is essentially based on Western interests and the need for long term stability in the Middle-East. Others view it as a moral necessity now that chemical weapons are involved, saying that chemical weapons provide an imperative, that using them breaches a fundamental principle of human dignity and that we must act to ensure this does not happen again. In a sense both are right. However, the second view is clearly normative rather than descriptive; one can argue that we should intervene on moral grounds, but it is a different thing to say that is why we will intervene. The moral argument is far more complicated than is generally accepted, and involves swallowing a whole host of difficult implications. For example, if chemical weapons represent a moral line, where does this leave the thousands killed using guns or sticks or knives or bombs in Syria? Is this morally defensible? Are their deaths any less worthy of our moral concern? Our concern with chemical weapons is not entirely moral; it also involves a national security element. Preventing the flow of chemical weapons into the hands of non-state actors – including the Syrian rebels – is a priority for the West in defending itself against possible future terrorist attacks. There is a legitimate concern against the use of chemical weapons, but it is not entirely moral. If it were, intervention would be much less likely.

Misconception 3 – That international military intervention without a UN mandate is still legitimate on humanitarian grounds

On Conservative Home Robert Halfon MP argues that the UN’s Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine essentially grants a mandate to any country. This is a misunderstanding of the doctrine, which could be very dangerous. More fundamentally however, Halfon misunderstands what R2P is. It is not a set of guidelines or rules, but an emerging norm. The reason it is emerging is because it is still highly controversial and far from perfect, as the previous attempts to implement the doctrine have shown. So, although we can appeal to R2P in making a case to the UN to intervene (or allow an intervention), it does not guarantee the legal certainty that Halfon appears to claim it does. Halfon also seems to misunderstand what R2P allows the international community to do. When the UN talks about the ‘international community’ with regards to R2P, what it means it ‘the international community represented by the Security Council’. So R2P gets us no closer to a legitimate response; it would still be blocked in the Security Council by Russia and China, both pro-Assad and anti-R2P.

Misconception 4- We should not aid the rebels because of the Muslim Brotherhood

This idea is fairly prevalent among those keen not to get involved, such as Sir Andrew Green. Conversely, fear of the Muslim Brotherhood is also the reason Tony Blair gives for supporting the military against the democratically elected government in Egypt. While Green and Blair both cite the Brotherhood to support differing opinions, they both demonstrate similarly strange approaches to foreign policy. Green might be right that if the Assad regime topples, the Muslim Brotherhood will gain power, attempt to implement Sharia and an Islamic state and rule Syria for a number of years. Of course he acknowledges the complexity of the issue, but also implies, rather strikingly, that the collapse of the regime would launch the Syrian Brotherhood into mainstream politics. However, the Syrian Brotherhood is very different to the central, more powerful Egyptian Brotherhood. Alison Pargeter notes the differences in her excellent book The Muslim Brotherhood: From Opposition To Power, and even if the relative liberalism of the Syrian Brotherhood is no more, it should still be clear that judging the Syrian Brotherhood on the actions of its Egyptian counterparts is a mistake. Perhaps more pertinently, we cannot claim with any certainty what might happen if Assad were to fall. The only certainty we have is that for as long as he stays in power, Syria will be drenched in blood.

Misconception 5 – The actions of the West will decide the future of the conflict and the long-term future of Syria

The general discussion in the West in the last week has – perhaps naturally – focussed on the options at our disposal in changing the course of the conflict. In discussing the options, many have rested on an assumption which, if once true, is no longer valid. We cannot assume, with the political revitalisation of Russia under Putin, China’s inevitable rise and the increasing assertiveness of the Arab world, that Western actions will have a huge effect in the long term. The age of U.S. unipolarity is dying if not dead, and we in the West must face up to this fact. We are no longer omnipotent. Intervention in Syria might have a short term effect, but the long term future of Syria will be more determined by the geopolitical forces of the Middle-East than the wishes of the United States. Our ambitions must, then, be limited to what is possible. Our approach to Syria must mirror this uncertainty; however the West ends up intervening, it will not mark the end of this damned tale.


After Obama’s red line of chemical weapons has been crossed, what now for the U.S. in Syria?

By Jack Thompson

The reports coming in yesterday morning of a chemical attack outside Damascus remind us that the Syrian Civil War is entering a dangerous phase, one not likely to be resolved internally. But what routes can international actors, most notably the United States, take to resolve the crisis?

Now might be a good time to look at President Obama’s options, and what is holding his administration back.

For a long time now, Obama has explained that chemical weapon use in Syria would be a ‘game changer’, yet since the first reports of their use, the US has remained on the sidelines, offering humanitarian aid, but unwilling to step up and engage against the Assad regime. Various ideas are floated around, with those favouring a drawn back approach advocating logistical support and supplying weapons to the rebels, whereas defence hawks, like John McCain (R-Arizona) pushing for a full intervention.

One of the proposed plans involves arming the rebels. There are fears that supporting the opposition could be problematic in the long term. Past ‘freedom fighters’ that have been supported by the US include Osama Bin Laden, Saddam Hussein, and Muammar Gaddafi. It would be unwise to strengthen groups that will eventually turn on the West. And it’s not a case of just promising to arm the official leaders, because the major rebel groups are in fact umbrella organisations consisting of various organisations and militias. The varied nature of these groups makes controlling the proliferation of weapons extremely difficult, especially when rebel leaders openly offer to share weaponry and resources with extremist groups.

When it comes to a full intervention however, there are a number of reasons we can attribute to the lack of action. First off, we cannot doubt the Obama administration’s willingness to use force, as seen through its liberal use of drones across countries like Qatar. However, Obama has been very reluctant to use any real intervention policy ever since he won the presidency. US involvement in the Libyan Civil War was drawn back, and part of a wider international coalition. Rhetorical support was offered during the Arab Spring, but by and large the US kept a wide berth. Since the Syrian uprising began in 2011, the administration has done its best to avoid definitive statements that would land them with a military intervention. Why?


The spectre of Iraq looms over the Obama administration, much like Vietnam did with Jimmy Carter. It’s not hard to see why: a trillion dollars and thousands of American lives later there is destabilised region and vast anti-American sentiment, both in the Middle East, and amongst the US’s allies.

Obama wants to avoid his Iraq, for a number of reasons. Firstly, he ran his first election as the ‘anti-Bush’; putting an end to illegal wars that damaged US prospects abroad. He spent the majority of his first term blaming Bush for the state of the country’s finances, for the diplomatic fallout of his policies, for the costly and failed war. To then turn around and intervene in a Middle East country that would likely bog down American troops for years to come would seem like a u-turn for the President. Of course, Syria is not Iraq, but comparisons can be made.

There are also financial arguments to be made. They may not be the most ethical ones to make alongside the daily deaths of Syrian civilians, but on the back of a recession, policymakers have a duty to manage the books. As Republican’s fight to balance the books, it seems unlikely that Obama will commit to another billion dollar conflict, as the money would likely come out of spending cuts at home, and potentially even derail his flagship policy, the Affordable Care Act (aka Obamacare), which he is battling a hostile congress to get funded. Extensive military action could not come at a worse time for the US economy.

There’s also the legal argument. Iraq was a coalition of a few nations that used questionable evidence to circumvent international law and invade another country. Returning to the idea that Obama is trying to fix the damage done by Bush, it is most likely he would prefer a course of action that is approved by the UN and the rest of the international community, and one that includes a vast amount of participants, where the US is not simply the major player with a few states assisting. However, with Russian and Chinese opposition on the Security Council to any major involvement by the UN, this issue is likely to be moot for the foreseeable future.

Obama is limited by the past, the present and the future. The Iraq syndrome that affects his administration is crippling any productive action in the Middle East, while the financial state of the US means any intervention would potentially mean crippling cuts to government programmes he has been championing. And arming the rebels could have dangerous consequences for the United States in the future, and further military action could enrage other regional actors and destabilise the Middle East.

The longer the US waits, the longer it risks losing key regional allies. Yet are the financial and legal costs too high for America to continue playing the world’s policeman? Have we reached a new time of national autonomy, where international anarchy reigns freely? Are we truly alone?

Syria and the perpetual crisis

By Neil Andrews

A visit to the world’s oldest city two years ago and you would have seen men playing board games out on dusty Damascene streets.  Not any longer.  The death toll since hostilities broke out between rebel forces and the government of Bashar al-Assad in March 2011 is 70,000 and rising, and yet the West does nothing.  Why?

The situation in Syria is deteriorating at an alarming rate.  Along with the tens of thousands already dead, up to 2 million Syrians are thought to have been displaced inside the country, many without proper shelter or access to medication.  Added to this is the growing refugee problem: an estimated 700,000 people are thought to have fled Syria into neighboring countries in recent months and the borders of Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan are bursting at the seams.  It is little surprise, then, that Syria’s neighbours are desperately struggling to cope with the rising influx of people and failing to provide ample healthcare and sanitation.  Added to this, a recent UN appeal aimed at raising $1.5 billion to assist Syrian refugees had only achieved 3% of its target.

The refugee problem is not all, though.  Syria itself remains in a perpetual state of violence and civil war.  Only 3 days ago a car bomb in the capital killed 53 people, a day after a mortar attack fatally wounded a player inside a local football stadium.  This latest wave of atrocities comes just weeks after the bodies of 80 suspected rebel troops were scooped out of a canal in Aleppo, the country’s largest city.  The men, who were later identified by family members, had been shot with a bullet to the head and their hands tied behind their backs, bearing all the hallmarks of a planned execution, most probably by regime troops.  Yet, despairingly, President Assad remains free to commit genocide.

There are two reasons why the West is reluctant to commit.  First is the support that Assad commands.  Inside Syria the government has a large Allawite following and the control of over 50,000 well-armed troops, as well as a pool of maybe thousands more to draw upon.  Supplementing this is the backing Assad enjoys from the Lebanese extremist party, Hezbollah, as well as financial and military aid from Iran, Iraq and Russia.  Indeed, it is the support from Russia, the world’s second-largest military power, that is especially demoralizing.  Having already blocked 3 UN Security Council resolutions aimed at evicting Assad, and on the verge of an agreement to sell air and naval defence systems (as well as a consignment of Yak-130 jets, with ground attack capabilities) to the Syrian government, Russia is proving a major thorn in the side of Western endeavors.  Despite the attempts last month of its Prime Minister, Dmitry Medvedev, to cool talk of Russia’s links to Assad, it is clear that the Kremlin is continuing to prop up the Middle Eastern despot.  Unless Russia withdraws its support for the regime, Assad will continue to sponsor the massacre of innocent Syrians and the West will be at pains to act.

Perhaps a bigger concern for the West is the danger of causing a greater pan-Arabian crisis.  Geopolitically, Syria is nestled in between a number of already highly volatile Middle Eastern nations, and an act of Western intervention carries the risk of inflaming ethnic divisions, as well as fuelling the jihadist cause.  Lebanon has close ties with Syria and any interference by the West has the potential to flare up pro- and anti-Assad divisions within the country.  Israel, which also shares a border with Syria, is another hotbed of political ferment – the installation of an Islamist party, similar to that of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, would only stoke anti-Islamic sentiment.

But this should not excuse the West’s absence.  Pushing for a no-fly zone over Syria, aiding legitimate rebel forces and increasing pressure on Russia would all be welcome moves.  If the West does not act quickly, Syrians will continue to die at an appalling rate and a once beautiful, historic country could burn to ash.

Syria: The conflict rages on


By James Nickerson

Democracy has spread like wildfire through Northern Africa and the Middle East in recent times, yet the conflict in Syria has diverged from what we saw in the likes of Egypt and Libya. Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime has lost almost all its legitimacy by Western standards, but the powers that lie in the USA and Europe can do little to support the rebels, due in part to Russia and China’s vetoing of sanctions within the United Nations.

Protests started in Damascus and Deraa in March 2011, which were quashed violently with a number of people dead. Amidst all of the unrest, President Assad released a number of political prisoners; a peculiar move for a man who just two months later would send army tanks to put down anti-regime protests. Shortly after this, in July, the opposition began to mobilize. More regionally, November 2011 saw the Arab league suspended Syria for not implementing the Arab peace plan, with international pressure mounting for President Assad to step down.

Not long after this, the Red Cross, in July 2012, declared that Syria was in the state of civil war. On first appearances the conflict in Syria is not different to those we have seen before, which began with protests and escalated to violent conflict until the dictator (hopefully) falls. Yet it seems apparent that at this stage Kofi Annan’s five-stage peace plan has failed, especially after his futile attempt to persuade President Putin to change Russia’s position regarding Syria. This raises the question of if and when the time for intervention in a more substantial way is an option.

The violence continues and Syria’s largest cities burn whilst hundreds of thousands of refugees escape to Turkey and Jordan, with 200,000 fleeing Aleppo in the light of recent engagement between forces. All of these factors make the war in Syria different, yet the problem in Syria is far greater than faced in other countries: Syria has chemical weapons. Not only does Syria have chemical weapons, but also they have not signed the Chemical Weapons Convention. This means, unlike Libya, which was in the process of actively reducing its chemical weapons stock, Syria is under no obligation with regards to their stocks.

The powers that be inside the Syrian government have stated that they will not use these weapons on their own citizens. This is obviously important, and somewhat encouraging if true, yet does not mean that the international community is safe. Nawaf Fares, the most senior political defector, has stated that ‘the regime will not hesitate to use chemical weapons if it is cornered’. In other words, any external attack, whether from the West or Israel, will be met with extreme retaliation. This again raises questions about whether it would be prudent for any military intervention. There are of course mixed opinions about what the impact of this would be, and BBC’s Jim Muir has stated how the West and Israel have been worried that Syria may deploy its stocks of chemical weapons.

It appears, however, that most countries are now supporting the rebels in their struggle. William Hague, British Foreign Secretary, has stated that Syria’s threat to use chemical weapons against foreign intervention is “unacceptable”, and has openly expressed his moral support for the Free Syrian Army.

Israel have gone one step further, with Ehub Barak, Israel’s Defence Minister reaffirming that its intelligence services are tracking the situation carefully, and affirming that Israel ‘cannot accept a situation’ in which the weapons are put in to the hand of the Shia guerrilla group. Benjamin Netanyaju, the Prime Minister stated that Israel would ‘have to act’ if any weapons were to fall to militant groups. This could be a major advantage for the West but for the USA in particular, who may be able to leave any intervention to Israel.

But Israel has another major problem: Iran. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad called for a world without Zionism in 2005, vowing to ‘wipe Israel off the map’. Given this, Israel’s focus must be somewhat on Iran at present, in order to stop Tehran developing nuclear weapons, with the backing of the USA, and Mitt Romney in particular. This leaves the conflict in Syria in a precarious position: any attack by the west may at present be imprudent, but how long can the international community stand idly by whilst the number of dead increase at the hands of a tyrant? An estimated 16,000 people have been killed since the start of the uprising, and while tighter sanctions are all the time being discussed and implemented, Mr. Fares maintains that President Assad will ‘only be removed by force’.

While on appearances a rebel victory is supported by most democratic states, the questions surrounding the chemical weapons will still a worrying threat. What would the rebels do with the stocks of chemical weapons? Would they be safer than under President Assad? Any country that has an interest in the area will be keen to make sure that if the rebels do prosper they implement a democratic government, which can be worked with to bring more stability to the region. Unfortunately, our leaders are stuck in a difficult position and therefore it appears that a victory will not be quickly or suddenly won.